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Abstract
Recently, several adversarial attack methods to black-box deep neural networks
have been proposed and they serve as an excellent testing bed for investigating
safety issues with DNNs. These methods generally take in the query and corre-
sponding feedback from the targeted DNN model and infer suitable attack patterns
accordingly. However, due to lacking prior and inefficiency in leveraging the query
information, these methods are mostly query-intensive. In this work, we propose
a meta attack strategy which is capable of attacking the target black-box model
with much fewer queries. Its high query-efficiency comes from prior abstraction
on training a meta attacker which can speed up the search for adversarial exam-
ples significantly. Extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR10 and tiny-Imagenet
demonstrate that, our meta-attack method can remarkably reduce the number of
model queries without sacrificing the attack performance. Moreover, the obtained
meta attacker is not restricted to a particular model but can be reused easily with
fast adaptive ability to attack a variety of models.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been widely applied and achieved state-of-art performance on a variety
of tasks including image recognition [11, 25], object detection [8, 26], segmentation [17, 31], and
speech recognition [12, 10]. Despite their great success, they are found to be susceptible to adversarial
attacks and suffer dramatic performance degradation in front of adversarial examples, even when
only tiny and invisible noise is imposed on the inputs [30].
To investigate the safety and robustness of deep neural networks, many adversarial attack methods
have been developed which can be roughly categorized into white-box [9, 19, 2, 18] and black-box
based ones [24, 1, 20]. In the white-box attack setting, the target model is transparent to the attacker
and imperceptible adversarial noise can be easily crafted to mislead this model by leveraging its
gradient information [9]. In contrast, in the black-box setting, the structure and parameters of the
target DNN model are invisible, and the adversary can only access the input-output pair in each query.
With a sufficient number of queries, black-box methods utilize the returned information to attack the
target model generally by estimating gradient [13, 20] or performing evolutionary optimization [13].
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Black-box attack is more feasible in realistic scenarios than white-box attack but these methods are
usually much more query-intensive. Such a drawback is largely because the returned information
of each queried example is sparse and very limited. During optimization, they simply integrate the
information between two sequential iterations brutally and ignore the implicit but profound message.
The returned information is thus not fully leveraged. Although emphasized in [13] that query-efficient
algorithms for generating adversarial examples are very meaningful in practice, how to enhance
query-efficiency for black-box attack remains an open problem. Studying this problem would also
help better understand safety and robustness issues of deep neural networks.
We address a query-efficiency concerned attack problem in this work. Particularly, we consider
only top-k probability scores accessible from the target black-box model. With this practical but
challenging scenario, we aim at three important objectives: lower query number, higher success
rate and smaller noise magnitude. We develop a meta-learning based attack method, which applies
meta learning to obtaining prior information from the successful attack patterns, and uses the prior
for efficient optimization. Specifically, we propose to train a meta attacker model through meta
learning [23], inspired by its success in solving few-shot learning problems. We first constitute
several classification models and utilize them to get pairs of (images, gradients) for max-margin logit
classification loss. Then we use the data pairs of each classification model to train the meta attacker.
After obtaining the attacker, we apply it to attacking a new black-box model for accelerating the
search for adversarial examples, together with coordinate-wise gradient estimation and fine-tuning.
Different with previous methods, we use the estimated gradient not only to update adversarial noise
but to fine-tune the well-trained attacker. After few-shot fine-tuning, the attacker is able to simulate
the gradient distribution of the target model.
We evaluate our method on MNIST [16], CIFAR10 [15] and tiny-ImageNet datasets [27], comparing
it with Zoo [3], Decision-Boundary [1] and Opt-attack [4]. Overall, we save at least 70% query
numbers compared with baseline methods. In both targeted and untargeted settings, we achieve
comparable attack success rate and adversarial perturbation to all baselines but with a significantly
reduced query number, which demonstrates the superior query-efficiency of our meta attacker.
2 Related Work
Many existing attack methods fall within the white-box setting, where detailed information about
the model, i.e. gradients and losses, is provided. Some classical examples are Fast-Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [9], IFGSM [18], DeepFool [19] and C&W attack [2]. [24] is the first work to
explore black-box attack. It tries to construct a substitute model with augmented data and transfer the
black-box attack problem to a white-box one. However, its attack performance is very poor due to the
limited transferability of adversarial examples between two different models. [1] considers a more
restricted case where only top-1 prediction classes are returned and proposes a random-walk based
attack method around the decision boundary. This method dispenses class prediction scores and hence
requires extensive model queries. Zoo [3] is a black-box version of C&W attack, achieving a similar
attack success rate and comparable visual quality as many white-box attack methods. However,
its coordinate-wise gradient estimation requires extensive model evaluations. More recently, [13]
proposes a query-limited setting with L∞ noise considered, and uses a natural evolution strategy
(NES) to enhance query efficiency. Though this method successfully controls the query number, the
noise imposed is larger than average. [20] proposes a novel local-search based technique to construct
numerical approximation to the network gradient, which is then carefully used to construct a small
set of pixels in an image to perturb. It suffers a similar problem as in [3] for pixel-wise attack. [4]
considers a hard-label black-box setting and formulates the problem as real-valued optimization that
is solved by a zeroth order optimization algorithm.
We briefly introduce some works on meta-learning related to our work. Meta-learning is a process
of learning how to learn. A meta-learning algorithm takes in a distribution of tasks, each being a
learning problem, and produces a quick learner that can generalize from a small number of examples.
Meta-learning is very popular recently for its fast adaptive ability. MAML [6] is the first to propose
this idea. Recently, a simplified algorithm Reptile [23] which is an approximation to the first-order
MAML is proposed, achieving higher efficiency in computation and consuming less memory. With
these superior properties, meta learning is applied to adversarial attack methods [32, 5]. [32] considers
attacking a graph neural network by modifying training data to worsen the performance after training.
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[5] just investigates the susceptibility of MAML to adversarial attacks and the transferability of the
obtained meta model to a specific task, with only limited results obtained.
3 Method
3.1 Black-box Attack Schemes
We first formulate the black-box attack problem and introduce the widely used solutions. We use
(x, t) to denote the pair of a natural image x and its true label t, and (xadv, tadv) to denote the
adversarial perturbed version of x and the returned label by the original classification model, tadv 6= t.
The problem of finding an adversarial example xadv with imperceivable difference from x to fail the
target model prediction can be formulated as
xadv = argmin
xˆ
f(xˆ) = argmin
xˆ
‖xˆ− x‖p + λLoss(xˆ,Mtar(xˆ), t), (1)
where ‖ · ‖p denotes the `p norm. Mtar(xˆ) is the returned logit or probability by the target
model Mtar. The first term ‖xadv − x‖p imposes a constraint on the perturbation magnitude
to enforce high similarity between the clean image x and the adversarial one xadv. The second
term λLoss(xˆ,Mtar(xˆ), t) measures whether xˆ is adversarial or not. One simple example is
Loss(xˆ,Mtar(xˆ), t) = max([Mtar(xˆ)]t −maxj 6=t[Mtar(xˆ)]j , 0). λ is a trade-off parameter.
White-box attack can utilize the gradient ∇xˆtf(xˆt) to perform gradient descent xˆt+1 = xˆt −∇xˆtf(xˆt). However in black-box attack we are considering in this work,∇xˆtf(xˆt) is not attainable.
One can only query the model to attack and receive feedback from model evaluation. In each model
evaluation, the target model receives an image and returns some useful information, such as hard
label, logit, probability score. Each model evaluation is a query, and such information is always
limited from each query. How to design a query efficient algorithm is a big concern.
Recently, zeroth-order optimization approaches circumvent the challenge of lacking the precise
gradient map by approximating it via model evaluation [7, 22]. In black-box attack, one can apply
such an estimation strategy to every pixel of an image to obtain the corresponding gradient information.
Formally, one can evaluate the gradient ∂f(x)/∂xi of the i-coordinate by
∂f(x)
∂xi
≈ f(x+ hei)− f(x− hei)
2h
, (2)
where h is a very samll number and ei is the i-th elementary basis. After obtaining the estimated
gradient, classical optimization algorithms [21, 14] can be used to infer the adversarial examples.
Though the estimated gradient may not be accurate, the convergence of these zeroth-order methods is
guaranteed under mild assumptions [7, 22].
However, naively applying the above gradient estimation to black-box attack would suffer dimension
explosion since it is coordinate-wise. For example, consider attacking a DNN classification model
using an image from the tiny-Imagenet dataset. The image size is 64 × 64 × 3 = 12,288 and one
needs to compute two close values at each pixel. Thus, obtaining a full gradient estimate will consume
more than 20,000 queries and model evaluations. This is not affordable in practice and is also the
fundamental limitation—the high query cost—of existing black-box attack methods [3]. In this work,
we address such a limitation via developing a query-efficient meta-learning based attack model.
3.2 Meta Attacker Training Method
To reduce the query cost for black-box attack, we apply meta learning to training a meta attacker
model, inspired by its recent success in few-shot learning problems [6, 23]. The meta attacker learns
to extract useful prior information of the gradient of a variety of models w.r.t. specific input samples
and thus it can infer the gradient for a new target model using only a few queries. After obtaining
such a meta attacker, we can replace the above zeroth-order gradient estimation with it to directly
estimate gradient with only a few queries.
Specifically, we first collect a set of pre-trained classification modelsM1, ...,Mn with fully acces-
sible gradient information. We feed an image x into these modelsM1, ...,Mn and compute the
following classification loss for each modelM:
Li = max
[
log[Mi(x)]t −max
j 6=t
log[Mi(x)]j , 0
]
. (3)
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Here t is the groundtruth label and j indexes other classes. [Mi(x)]t is the probability score of
the true label predicted by the model Mi, and [Mi(x)]j denotes the probability scores of other
classes. We perform one step back-propagation w.r.t. the input imagesX on the loss (3) and obtain
the corresponding gradient for the input Gi = ∇xLi. We collect a set of (X,Gi) pairs and use them
to train the meta attacker.
The meta attackerAθ with parameter θ is trained by minimizing following loss featuring fast learning:
min
θ
L(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i
Li(θ;x, gi) = 1
n
n∑
i
‖Aθ−α∇θLi(θ;x,gi)(x′)− gi′‖2. (4)
Each group (x, gi) contains a few examples randomly sampled from each (X,Gi). θ −
α∇θLi(θ;x, gi) denotes the update of the meta attacker parameters on each group. Since (x, gi)
contains only a few samples, minimizing the above loss would give an initial meta attacker parameter
θ which can fast adapt to new data through gradient descent based fine-tuning. Therefore, the obtained
meta attacker can be used to attack new black-box models by estimating their gradient information
through a few queries (x, g).
More concretely, the adaptation of the meta attacker to a specific task can be achieved by one or
multiple gradient descent: θ′i := θ − α∇θLi(θ;x, gi). For a sensitive position of the meta attacker,
we follow the update strategy of Reptile [23] in meta learning: θ := θ +  1n
∑n
i=1(θ
′
i − θ). In this
way, our meta attacker is able to generalize to a new task from a very small number of samples.
Detailed training process of our meta attacker is described in Algorithm 1.
Our designed attacker A has a similar structure as an autoencoder which consists of symmetric
convolution and de-convolution layers and outputs a gradient map with the same size as the input. Its
architecture details are provided in the experiment.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Meta Attack Algorithm (Training)
Input: Input imagesX , groundtruth gradients Gi generated from classification modelsMi; Sample
a few samples (x, gi) from (X,Gi) to form task Ti;
1: Randomly initialize θ;
2: while not done do
3: for all Ti do
4: Evaluate∇θLTi(Aθ) with respect to (x, gi);
5: Update θ′i := θ − α∇θLi(θ;x, gi);
6: end for
7: Update θ := θ +  1n
∑n
i=1(θ
′
i − θ);
8: end while
Output: Meta model Aθ.
3.3 Query-efficient Attack
As mentioned above, an effective adversarial attack relies on optimizing the loss function (1) w.r.t.
the input image to find the adversarial example of the target modelMtar. Differently, our proposed
method applies the meta attacker A to predicting the gradient map of a test image x0 directly.
Particularly, we update the meta attacker based on query information with the following periodic
scheme. Suppose we have a test image denoted as x ∈ Rp which is perturbed to xt ∈ Rp at iteration
t. If (t+ 1) mod m = 0, our method performs zeroth-order gradient estimation to obtain gradient
map gt for fine-tuning the meta attacker. For further enhancing the efficiency, instead of estimating
the full gradient map through all p coordinates, we just select q of the p coordinates to estimate.
The indexes of these coordinates are determined by the gradient map gt−1 in the last iteration by
selecting top-q indexes, denoted as It, with largest values. We feed the image xt into meta attacker
A and compute the MSE loss on indexes It, i.e. L = [‖Aθ(xt)− gt‖2]It . Then we perform gradient
descent for the MSE loss with a few steps to update the parameters θ of our meta attacker. For other
iterations, we use the meta attacker directly without updating it. This can save the number of queries
significantly.
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We then use the periodically updated attacker Aθ to iteratively generate the gradient gt = Aθ(xt)
for producing the adversarial sample x′t by [x
′
t]It = [x
′
t]It + β[gt]It where β is tunable. The details
are summarized in Algorithm 2.
We make a few remarks here. First, though we just use q coordinates to fine-tune our meta attacker
A every m iterations, the meta attacker A is trained to ensure that it could abstract the gradient
distribution of different xt and learn to predict the gradient from a few samples with simple fine-
tuning. Secondly, the most query-consuming part lies in zeroth-order gradient estimation, due to its
coordinate-wise nature. However, we only do this every m iterations. Intuitively, larger m implies
less gradient estimation computation and fewer queries. Besides, for gradient estimation, we only
select top-q coordinates which can be much smaller than dimension p of the input. This also largely
reduces the query number.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Meta Attack Algorithm (Attacking)
Input: Test image x0 with label t, meta attacker Aθ, target model Mtar, iteration interval m,
selected top-q coordinates;
1: for t = 0, 1, 2, ... do
2: if (t+ 1) mod m = 0 then
3: Perform zeroth-order gradient estimation on top q coordinates, denoted as It and obtain gt;
4: Fine-tune meta attacker A with (xt, gt) on It;
5: else
6: Generate the gradient map gt directly from meta attacker A with xt, select coordinates It;
7: end if
8: Update [x′]It = [xt]It + β[gt]It ;
9: ifMtar(x′) 6= t then
10: xadv = x′;
11: break;
12: else
13: xt+1 = x′;
14: end if
15: end for
Output: adversarial example xadv .
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments to compare our proposed meta attacker with state-of-the-
art black-box attack methods including Zoo [3], the decision-based black-box attack (Decision-
Boundary) [1] and hard label attack (Opt-attack) [4]. We also compare a meta guided attacker with
the above baselines, which is denoted as “Meta Guided”. It is trained and fine-tuned in the same way
as our proposed meta attacker. The only difference is it obtains gradient estimated numerically from
the selected coordinates while our meta attacker applies gradient predicted by itself. They both apply
the corresponding gradient to selecting top-q coordinates. Comparing our proposed meta attacker
and its Meta Guided variant would help understand the effectiveness of our meta attacker in gradient
estimation and justify the benefits of selecting critical image locations to attack. Lastly, we perform
model analysis experiments to reveal the effectiveness and generalizability of our meta attacker.
4.1 Settings
Datasets and Target Models We evaluate the attack performance on MNIST [16] for handwritten
digit recognition, CIFAR10 [15] and tiny-Imagenet [27] for object classification. The architecture
details of four classification models on MNIST are given in Table 1, where Net4 is used as the target
modelMtar, and Net1, Net2, Net3 are used for training the meta attacker. On CIFAR-10, we choose
ResNet18 [11] as the target model Mtar and use VGG13, VGG16 [28] and GoogleNet [29] for
training our meta attacker. On tiny-Imagenet, we choose VGG19 and ResNet34 as the target model
separately, and use VGG13, VGG16 and ResNet18 for training the meta attacker together.
Attack Protocols For a target black-box modelMtar , obtaining a pair of (input-output) is consid-
ered as one query. We use the mis-classification rate as attack success rate; 100 images are randomly
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Table 1: Neural network architectures used on MNIST. Conv: convolutional layer, FC: fully connected layer.
Net1 Net2 Net3 Net4
Conv(6, 5, 5) + ReLu Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128, 3, 3) + Tanh
MaxPool(2,2) Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Conv(64, 8, 8) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
Conv(16, 5, 5) + ReLu Dropout(0.25) Conv(128, 6, 6) + Relu Conv(64, 3, 3) + Tanh
MaxPool(2,2) FC(128) + Relu Conv(128, 5, 5) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
FC(120) + Relu Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) FC(128) + Relu
FC(84) + Relu FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
FC(10) + Softmax
selected from each dataset as test images. To evaluate overall noise added by the attack methods, we
use the mean L2 distance across all the samples noise(Mtar) = 1n
∑n
i=1 ‖xadvi,A,Mtar −xi‖2, where
xadvi,A,Mtar denotes the adversarial version for the authentic sample xi.
Implementation Details For all the experiments, we use the same architecture for the meta attacker
A, which consists of four convolutional layers and four deconvolutional layers. We use Reptile [23]
with 0.01 learning rate to train meta attacker. Fine-tuning parameters are set as m = 5 for MNIST
and CIFAR10; m = 3 for tiny-Imagenet. Top q = 128 coordinates are selected as part coordinates for
attacker fine-tuning and model attacking on MNIST; and q = 500 on CIFAR10 and tiny-Imagenet.
4.2 Comparison with Baselines
We conduct experimental comparison with baselines for both the untargeted and targeted black-box
attack on the three datasets. We show that our meta attacker can achieve similar success rate and
noise magnitude as baselines, but using much fewer queries.
Untargeted Attack Untargeted attack aims to generate adversarial examples that would be mis-
classified by the attacked model into any category different from the ground truth one. The detailed
results for each attack and each dataset are shown in Table 2. Our method is competitive with
previous attack methods in terms of adversarial perturbation and success rate, but our query number
is largely reduced. More specifically, the query number in our meta attacker is at least 92% less
than baselines on MNIST, and 70% less than [3] on CIFAR10. On tiny-Imagenet, we reduce at least
75% queries when attacking VGG19 and 73% when attacking ResNet34. The meta guided attacker
achieves smaller L2 distortion on CIFAR10 and tiny-Imagenet datasets. These results demonstrate the
remarkable advantages of gathering and utilizing useful information from each query in our method.
We also compare the results of our method with Zoo from a query-efficiency perspective. We
experiment on CIFAR10 and tiny-Imagenet by limiting the query number to a fixed value and
compare the success rate. The results are shown in Fig. 1 and 3. We notice that for different query
thresholds, the success rate of our method is 2 to 3 times higher than Zoo. This is because that testing
samples have different L2 distances to the decision boundary. When the number of queries is limited,
Zoo [3] only works over the easier testing samples with closer L2 distortion distance to the decision
boundary. Higher success rate of our method indicates that our meta attacker can predict correct
gradient—even the query information is limited—toward the decision boundary for harder testing
samples. These results give strong evidence on effectiveness of our proposed method for enhancing
query efficiency.
Targeted Attack In the targeted setting, one aims to generate adversarial noise such that the
perturbed sample would be mis-classified into any pre-specified category. This is a more strict setting
than the untargeted attack. For fair comparison, we define the target label for each sample in the
following way: a sample with label l gets the target label (l + 1) mod #classes. We use the same
meta attacker as above. The results on MNIST, CIFAR10 and tiny-ImageNet are shown in Table 3.
Similar to untargeted attack, we achieve comparable noise and success rate with largely reduced
query numbers. On tiny-Imagenet, when attacking VGG19, our method decreases 87% queries and
reduces the query by 78% when attacking ResNet34. It is worth noting that compared to baseline
Zoo, our method generates smaller noise. Our guided meta attacker gains lower L2 distortion on
MNIST, tiny-Imagenet and remarkably better success rate on tiny-Imagenet Resnet34.
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Table 2: MNIST, CIFAR10 and tiny-ImageNet untargeted attack comparison: Meta attacker attains comparable
success rate and L2 distortion as baselines, and significantly reduces query numbers.
Dataset / Target model Method Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
MNIST / Net4
Zoo [3] 1.00 1.61 21,760
Decision Boundary [1] 1.00 1.85 13,630
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 1.85 12,925
Meta Guided (ours) 1.00 1.73 5,975
Meta attack (ours) 1.00 1.79 1,024
CIFAR10 / Resnet18
Zoo [3] 1.00 0.30 8,192
Decision Boundary [1] 1.00 0.30 17,010
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 0.33 20,407
Meta Guided (ours) 1.00 0.26 6,254
Meta attack (ours) 0.92 0.33 2,438
tiny-ImageNet / VGG19
Zoo [3] 1.00 0.52 27,827
Decision Boundary [1] 1.00 0.52 49,942
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 0.53 71016
Meta Guided (ours) 1.00 0.57 16,460
Meta attack (ours) 0.98 0.54 6,826
tiny-ImageNet / Resnet34
Zoo [3] 1.00 0.47 25,344
Decision Boundary [1] 1.00 0.48 49,982
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 0.52 60,437
Meta Guided (ours) 0.98 0.41 16,040
Meta attack (ours) 0.98 0.49 6,866
Table 3: MNIST, CIFAR10 and tiny-ImageNet targeted attack comparison: Meta attack significantly outperforms
other black-box methods in query numbers.
Dataset / Target model Method Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Queries
MNIST / Net4
Zoo [3] 1.00 2.63 23,552
Decision Boundary [1] 0.64 2.71 19,951
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 2.33 99,661
Meta Guided (ours) 1.00 2.22 8,325
Meta attack (ours) 1.00 2.41 1,872
CIFAR10 / Resnet18
Zoo [3] 1.00 0.55 66,400
Decision Boundary [1] 0.58 0.53 16,250
Opt-attack [4] 1.00 0.50 121,810
Meta Guided (ours) 1.00 0.56 27,437
Meta attack (ours) 0.90 0.52 21,188
tiny-ImageNet / VGG19
Zoo [3] 0.74 1.26 119,648
Decision Boundary [1] - - -
Opt-attack [4] 0.66 1.14 252,009
Meta Guided (ours) 0.73 0.99 76,459
Meta attack (ours) 0.54 1.24 15,813
tiny-ImageNet / Resnet34
Zoo [3] 0.60 1.03 88,966
Decision Boundary [1] - - -
Opt-attack [4] 0.78 1.00 214,015
Meta Guided (ours) 0.84 0.99 88,418
Meta attack (ours) 0.54 1.21 19,516
4.3 Analysis
Meta Attacker Training and Query Efficiency We first test the benefits of meta training by
comparing the performance of a meta-trained attacker with a Gaussian randomly initialized attacker
without meta training. Testing on three datasets, Fig. 2 shows their success rate, and L2 distortion
and query count results for initial success. The meta pre-trained attacker achieves average 7%
higher success rate with 16% lower L2 distortion and 30% less queries, compared with the randomly
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initialized one. This justifies the benefits of our deployed meta training for enhancing the query
efficiency and improving attack performance.
Guaranteed by fine-tuning iterations, the randomly initialized meta attacker succeeds over many
testing samples. The fine-tuning iterations work like an inner training loop in meta training process.
Hence, sufficient fine-tuning iterations could train the randomly initialized meta attacker as well as
well-trained meta attacker. This explains the effectiveness of the randomly initialized meta attacker on
many testing samples compromised by more queries. However, the randomly initialized meta attacker
could not predict gradient as accurate as the well-trained meta attacker during earlier iterations. Such
inaccuracy leads to larger L2 distortion at the beginning. On the contrary, the meta training process
enables the well-trained meta attacker to fast-adapt to current testing samples. These results highlight
the significant advantages of our meta model towards to black-box attack. The meta-training of the
meta attacker make it familiar with gradient patterns of various models.
Generalizability Here, we aim to show that our meta attacker trained on one dataset can be
transferred to other divergent datasets and still achieves good attack performance. To this end, we
conduct this experiment between CIFAR10 and tiny-Imagenet. These two datasets are both for image
classification but differ in image classes and size. We conduct three groups of experiments. We
first apply the meta attacker trained on CIFAR10 to attack the target model VGG19, ResNet34 on
tiny-Imagenet respectively, which are different from those models for training the meta attacker.
Namely, the meta attacker tested on CIFAR10 has no privileged prior and is not familiar with neither
tiny-Imagenet dataset nor the corresponding classification models. Similarly, we also use the meta
attacker trained on tiny-Imagenet and classification models to attack the target ResNet18 model
on CIFAR10. Fig. 4 shows the success rate, L2 distortion and queries results. The transferred
meta attackers attain almost the same success rate and L2 distortion comparing to well trained meta
attackers with slightly more queries. Different from the randomly initialized meta attacker, the
transferred meta attacker adapts to current testing samples rapidly, and it avoids irreversible noise
generated in earlier iterations. These results show the good generalizability and robustness of our
proposed meta attacker.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a meta-based black-box attack method that largely reduces demanded
query numbers without compromising in attack success rate and distortion. We train a meta attacker
and incorporate it into the optimization process to decrease the number of queries. We conduct
both untargeted attack and targeted attack on MNIST, CIFAR10 and tiny-ImageNet to verify its
effectiveness. Extensive numerical results confirm the superior query-efficiency of our method over
selected baselines. We also prove the necessity and generalizability of our designed meta attack
method.
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